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Psychological research has firmly estab-
lished that risk preferences are transient 
states shaped by past experiences, current 
knowledge, and feelings as well as the char-
acteristics of the decision environment. We 
begin this article with a brief review of evi-
dence supporting this conception as well as 
different psychological theories explaining 
how preferences are constructed. Next, we 
introduce the distributed perspective on 
human cognition and show how it may 
offer a promising framework for unify-
ing seemingly incompatible accounts. We 
conclude by suggesting new directions for 
better capturing the essence of preference 
construction in laboratory research.
On the PsychOlOgy Of human 
Preferences and risky chOices
Psychologists have long assumed that core 
cognitive processes such as memory, percep-
tion, and attention are inherently construc-
tive – they are the product of the content 
of thoughts and the situation within which 
people are embedded when they think 
(Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1967). Risk prefer-
ences are no exception. As Lichtenstein and 
Slovic (2006, p. 1) put it: “in many situations 
we do not really know what we prefer; we 
must construct our preferences as the situa-
tion arises.” Scholars often situate the origins 
of the concept of preference construction in 
Simon’s (1956, 1990) focus on the bounded 
capacities of the human information-pro-
cessing system on the one hand, and the 
shaping properties of the environment 
within which decisions are made, on the 
other. In Simon’s words “Human rational 
behavior … is shaped by a scissors whose 
two blades are the structure of task environ-
ments and the computational capabilities of 
the actor” (Simon, 1990, p. 7).
The notion that preferences are con-
structed is supported by a body of evidence 
that is both vast and varied. Lichtenstein 
and Slovic’s (1971) work on preference rever-
sals demonstrated the key role of response 
mode – bidding for a bet vs. choosing a 
bet – in shaping preferences for risky gam-
bles. The work of Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1981) on choice framing illustrated how 
the superficial framing of the description 
of options can cause a reversal in risk prefer-
ences – from risk-seeking preferences in a 
choice between options framed with losses 
to risk-averse preferences when the same 
choice is framed with gains. More recently 
research has shown that preferences may 
also depend on how outcomes are expe-
rienced – either as a descriptive summary, 
or through actual sampling (Hertwig et al., 
2004). Meanwhile, the impact of transient 
states such as affect and feelings on risk 
judgments (Slovic et al., 2002) further cor-
roborates the conception of preferences as 
situated in time and space.
Several theories have been proposed 
to explain how preferences and associ-
ated decisions may be constructed. Some 
conceive preference construction as result-
ing from the impact of the environment 
on individuals’ strategy choice or repre-
sentations. The ecological approach (e.g., 
Brighton and Todd, 2009) proposes that 
the mind is endowed with an “adaptive 
toolbox” containing purpose-built simple 
decision heuristics that exploit the struc-
ture of the information in the immediate 
environment. The choice goals framework 
(Bettman et al., 1998) also assumes that 
individuals possess a repertoire of choice 
heuristics, acquired through experience or 
training. From these perspectives, an envi-
ronment with a particular information 
structure will shape cognition by inviting 
the application of the decision heuristic that 
is most adapted to this structure. Similarly, 
accounting for risky choice framing, pros-
pect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
suggests that the environment affects risk 
preferences and decisions through its 
impact on individuals’ representations – as 
opposed to its impact on strategy   selection 
– as decisions outcomes may be repre-
sented as gains or losses, depending on the 
reference point made salient in the task 
environment. Meanwhile, other   theories 
characterized preference construction as 
an internal process where the role of the 
individual’s immediate environment is less 
prominent. Svenson’s (1996) differentiation 
and consolidation (DiffCon) theory posits 
that construction occurs through cycles of 
alterations of the decision task’s mental 
representation in order to single out the 
alternative of choice. Search for dominance 
structure (SDS) theory (Montgomery, 
1998) offers a similar conception where 
preferences are assumed to arise from the 
restructuring of the mental representation 
of attribute information to identify the 
dominant alternative. Svenson (1996) does 
note that context and decision structure may 
influence the decision rules that are elicited. 
Montgomery (1998) adds that “individual 
may also intervene in the external world to 
increase the support for the to-be-chosen 
alternative” (p. 287, emphasis added) but 
he does not specify what those interventions 
may be, what might be intervened upon, or 
by which mechanisms such interventions 
may result in increased support.
While these theories stress important 
features of the constructive process of 
preferences, we also believe that they offer 
an incomplete view of this process because 
they omit an essential aspect of how people 
may naturally construct their preferences: 
through their actions on their immediate 
environment. In the next section of this 
article, we present a theoretical framework 
that places interactivity at the forefront of 
efforts to understand choice preferences.
BeyOnd situated cOgnitiOn: 
cOgnitiOn distriButed
A group of cognitive scientists, initially 
drawn from cognitive ergonomics and 
anthropology, have lobbied for a shift in 
the main unit of analysis to understand 
thinking (e.g., Hollan et al., 2000). They 
reject a traditional model of the mind 
where cognition is sandwiched between 
perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs 
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of the information; whereas a dynamic one 
may better support the development of a 
productive representation of the problem 
information.
Concretely, better understanding how 
preferences may be constructed in the 
physical world will involve designing exper-
imental settings where participants are no 
longer limited to alter the information 
presented to them mentally. This, we sur-
mise, will lead to a revision of the amount 
of information that people are actually 
capable of computing when constructing 
preferences. For example, a canonical rep-
resentation of the information in choice 
framing tasks such as the Asian Disease 
problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) 
requires taking into account all outcomes 
of concurrent decisions. Such a bias-free 
representation has been previously ruled 
out as psychologically implausible, assum-
ing that it would exceed human computa-
tional capabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1984).  Maule and Villejoubert (2007) 
surmised that participants might instead 
mentally switch between a gain-framed 
representation and a loss-framed repre-
sentation, in a similar manner to the per-
spective-switching occurring when people 
are presented with ambiguous figures such 
as the Necker cube. Choice behavior would 
then be determined by the dominant repre-
sentation at the moment of choice. Taking 
a distributed-cognition approach to study 
choice framing, one could use playing cards 
presenting a positive or negative outcome 
associated with each of two alternatives. 
Probabilities of outcomes would be pre-
sented as the relative proportion of positive 
and negative outcomes. This would enable 
participants to manipulate, spread, arrange 
and rearrange the cards, and perhaps con-
trast losses and gains while constructing 
their preference. Importantly, rather than 
constrain thinking, the manipulability 
afforded by the material presentation of 
the information would instead support – 
if not augment – people’s computational 
abilities. In such a situation, the mental 
switch of focus between a gain-framed 
and a loss-framed representation (Maule 
and Villejoubert, 2007) could then be sup-
ported by the physical presentation of the 
information and thus, considerably reduc-
ing the mental efforts required for switch-
ing focus. Moreover, this would make the 
expressions into true equations. Moreover, 
whereas numeracy predicted performance 
in the paper-and-pencil group, perfor-
mance was best predicted by visuo-spatial 
reasoning skills in the interactive group. 
These results suggest that different types of 
resources and skills were recruited in the 
interactive and non-interactive versions of 
the task, respectively.
The distributed-cognition perspective 
may also offer a novel way to conceive the 
role of the environment in the construc-
tion of preferences. The theoretical frame-
works reviewed earlier assume that the 
environment shapes cognitive activity. In 
experiments used to test these approaches, 
however, the environment is often pre-
sented in a two-dimensional, fixed presen-
tation akin to the non-interactive version 
of the matchstick algebra task, offering 
linguistic or numerical information that 
is presented in essentially inflexible and 
intangible formats. These environments 
severely limit individuals’ natural tendency 
to think with their eyes and hands. The 
distributed-cognition perspective could 
offer a new window onto the process of 
preference construction, focusing on the 
coupling between people’s cognition and 
the strategic and opportunistic manipula-
tion of the information populating their 
immediate physical space. As Weller et al.’s 
(in press) study illustrates, adopting a dis-
tributed perspective on cognition does not 
necessitate studying cognitive activities in 
naturalistic settings. In fact, we believe that 
the potential of this approach resides in its 
promise to better capture the essence of 
cognitive processes in general, and pref-
erence construction in particular, within 
laboratory settings.
Adopting a distributed-cognition per-
spective also highlights a potentially inva-
lid assumption underpinning alternative 
accounts of preference construction, such 
as SDS theory (Montgomery, 1998) and the 
DiffCon theory (Svenson, 1996) reviewed 
above – and more generally, numerous the-
ories accounting for higher level cognitive 
processes – namely, the assumption that 
the mental restructuring of a rigid pres-
entation of the informational landscape 
is equivalent to the physical restructur-
ing of this landscape, in the individual’s 
immediate environment. It is not: an 
inflexible physical problem presentation 
exerts gravity on people’s effort to depart 
(to adapt Hurley, 2001). Instead they argue 
that cognition is the product of a distributed 
system that reflects the dynamic meshwork 
of resources internal to the reasoner (such 
as cognitive capacities, acquired knowledge) 
as well as resources external to the reasoner 
(such as artifacts, people, cultural beliefs; 
Kirsh, 2009, 2010; Hutchins, 2010). A key 
notion in the systemic perspective is that 
people interact with external resources to 
augment and facilitate thinking. From a 
distributed-cognition perspective, think-
ing is the product of embodied and embed-
ded mental and physical activities. In other 
words, people do not just “think with their 
heads,” they also “think with their eyes and 
hands” in an environment that affords inter-
action. This results in an extended cognitive 
system (Wilson and Clark, 2009), akin to 
an ecological niche (cf. Laland et al., 2000) 
enabling people to exceed the capacities of 
their unaided, non-extended mind.
People act upon their environment 
when they think, and more specifically 
when they evince a preference, in a rich 
and varied manner; yet this activity is rarely 
the focus of research. People, generally, do 
not choose their homes or their cars from 
written descriptions. Rather, they walk in 
potential flats, project and sketch furniture 
placement, open and close wardrobes, sit on 
the terrace to help simulate what it would be 
like to live in the place. In other words, they 
do not only adapt to their environment, 
they actively shape, manipulate, and inter-
act with it to support their decision-making.
The distributed perspective has been 
the subject of ethnographic analysis “in 
the wild” (Hutchins, 1995), but it can also 
guide more controlled experimental work 
(Fioratou and Cowley, 2009; Weller et al., in 
press). For example, we recently examined 
performance on matchstick algebra prob-
lems which present participants with a false 
algebraic equation made of matchsticks 
and require them to move one matchstick 
to form a true equation (Knoblich et al., 
1999). Adopting a distributed-cognition 
perspective, we compared performance on 
the traditional paper-and-pencil version of 
the task with performance in an interactive 
version where participants could physically 
manipulate the matchsticks, using a modi-
fiable, three-dimensional, physical presen-
tation of the equation. Participants in the 
interactive group were significantly more 
likely to achieve insight to transform these 
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To conclude, Simon’s (1956, 1990) 
emphasis on the major shaping role played 
by the environment within which decisions 
are made has often been used to explain 
how preferences are constructed. Simon’s 
argument has often been summarized 
as focusing on the “interaction” between 
individuals’ mental activities and their 
immediate environment (e.g., Brighton 
and Todd, 2009, p. 339; Lichtenstein and 
Slovic, 2006, p. 23; Bettman et al., 1998, p. 
187). However, interactivity as such never 
figures in either Simon’s (1956, 1990) 
account or in subsequent theoretical efforts. 
Some have developed theories explaining 
how decision-makers may select choice 
heuristics that are fitted to the structure of 
the environment. Others have stressed the 
importance of the mental restructuring of 
the information in preference construction. 
In this article we sought to illustrate how 
neither approaches can fully account for the 
essence of preference construction as it may 
occur in natural settings. We propose that 
this is because past research has neglected 
an important aspect of cognition – viz., how 
interactions with the world may influence 
and support mental processes. Whether, 
under what conditions, and by which pro-
cesses, freeing up decision-makers’ hands 
may indeed affect the way they construct 
their preferences, may thus prove to be an 
important new avenue for research.
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